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Abstract
We study revenue-optimal pricing and driver com-
pensation in ridesharing platforms when drivers
have heterogeneous preferences over locations. If
a platform ignores drivers’ location preferences,
it may make inefficient trip dispatches; moreover,
drivers may strategize so as to route towards their
preferred locations. In a model with stationary
and continuous demand and supply, we present a
mechanism that incentivizes drivers to both (i) re-
port their location preferences truthfully and (ii)
always provide service. In settings with uncon-
strained driver supply or symmetric demand pat-
terns, our mechanism achieves (full-information)
first-best revenue. Under supply constraints and
unbalanced demand, we show via simulation that
our mechanism improves over existing mechanisms
and has performance close to the first-best.
1 Introduction
Uber connected its first rider to a driver in the summer of
2009,1 and since then, ridesharing platforms have dramat-
ically changed the way people get around in urban areas.
Ridesharing platforms allow a wide array of people to be-
come drivers and—in contrast to traditional taxi systems—
use dynamic “surge pricing” at times when demand exceeds
supply. Properly designed, dynamic pricing improves sys-
tem efficiency [Castillo et al., 2017], increases driver sup-
ply [Chen and Sheldon, 2015], and makes the system reliable
for riders [Hall et al., 2015].
A growing literature studies how to structure prices for rid-
ers and compensation for drivers so as to optimally account
for variation in supply and demand [Banerjee et al., 2015;
Bimpikis et al., 2016; Castillo et al., 2017; Ma et al., 2019].
However, existing models leave aside driver heterogeneity. In
practice, some drivers may prefer to drive in the city and oth-
ers in the suburbs, and many prefer to start or end their days
in a particular location. A matching system that treats drivers
as homogeneous can make inefficient matches, with drivers
∗The full version of this paper is available at https://drive.google.
com/file/d/1i8yal704AYSZPThhQHmJnNw o2iGhn0J/view
1https://www.uber.com/newsroom/history/, visited 02/25/2019.
preferring to fulfill each others’ dispatch instructions instead
of their own.
The problem, however, goes beyond simple efficiency loss.
A core feature of platforms is that drivers retain the flexibility
to choose when and where to provide service. Every ride the
platform proposes needs to be accepted voluntarily, forming
an optimal response for the driver [Ma et al., 2019]. This kind
of incentive alignment simplifies participation for drivers and
also makes behavior more predictable. But without account-
ing for heterogeneity, a platform cannot fully understand a
driver’s preferences or achieve full incentive alignment.
Indeed, platforms have experimented with methods to in-
corporate driver heterogeneity. As of Summer 2019, Uber
allows drivers to indicate—twice a day—that they would like
to take trips in the direction of a particular location.2 How-
ever, mechanisms that account for driver preferences can also
have unintended consequences if not designed properly. By
saying “I want to drive South,” a driver biases her dispatches
in a way that could also promote more profitable trips.3
In this paper, we introduce the study of driver location pref-
erence in a mechanism design framework. In Section 2, we
adapt a model originally conceived by Bimpikis et al. [2016]
to an economy where drivers prefer a particular location.
In Section 3, we present the Preference-Attentive Rideshar-
ing Mechanism (PARM), which elicits driver preferences
and sets a revenue-optimal pricing policy. We show that
PARM is incentive-compatible, and that it achieves the full-
information, first-best revenue when supply is unconstrained
or when demand is symmetric. In Section 4, we study set-
tings with constrained supply and asymmetric demand, using
simulations to compare the revenue and welfare performance
of PARM to existing ridesharing mechanisms. We show that
PARM achieves close to first-best revenue and typically out-
performs even the best case for preference-oblivious pricing
(where strategic behavior hurts efficiency). Proofs not pre-
sented in the text are deferred to Appendix A.
1.1 Related Work
Existing work on pricing and dispatching in ridesharing plat-
forms does not account for the heterogeneity of drivers.
2https://help.uber.com/partners/article/set-a-driver-destination?
nodeId=f3df375b-5bd4-4460-a5e9-afd84ba439b9, visited 2/25/19.
3https://therideshareguy.com/uber-drops-destination-filters-
back-to-2-trips-per-day/, visited 2/25/19.
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Our work builds on work of Bimpikis et al. [2016], who
show that under a continuum model, and with stationary de-
mand and unlimited driver supply, a ridesharing platform’s
revenue is maximized when the demand pattern across dif-
ferent locations is balanced. They show via simulation that in
comparison to setting a uniform price for all locations, pricing
trips differently depending on trip origins improves revenue.
Relative to the Bimpikis et al. [2016] model, we allow lim-
ited driver supply; moreover, each driver in our model has a
preferred location. We thus introduce a reporting phase, in
which drivers report their preferred locations. We then mod-
ify the matching and pricing formulations in order to align
incentives.
Ma et al. [2019] study the incentive alignment of drivers
in the presence of spatial imbalance and temporal variation
of supply and demand. Castillo et al. [2017] show that dy-
namic pricing mitigates inefficient “wild goose chase” phe-
nomena for platforms that employ myopic dispatching strate-
gies. Modeling a shared vehicle system as a continuous-time
Markov chain, Banerjee et al. [2017] establish approxima-
tion guarantees for a static, state-independent pricing pol-
icy. Ostrovsky and Schwarz [2019] study the economy of
self-driving cars, focusing on car-pooling and market equilib-
rium. Queuing-theoretic approaches have also been adopted:
Banerjee et al. [2015] show the robustness of dynamic pric-
ing, Afe`che et al. [2018] study the impact of driver autonomy
and platform control, and Besbes et al. [2018] analyze the re-
lationship between capacity and performance.
There are various empirical studies, analyzing the impact
of dynamic pricing [Hall et al., 2015; Chen and Sheldon,
2015], the labor market for Uber drivers [Hall and Krueger,
2016; Hall et al., 2017], consumer surplus [Cohen et al.,
2016], the value of flexible work [Chen et al., 2017], the
gender earnings gap [Cook et al., 2018], and the commission
vs. medallion lease based compensation models [Angrist et
al., 2017].
2 Model
We consider a discrete time, infinite horizon model of a
ridesharing network with discrete locations, L = {1, . . . , n}.
Following the baseline model of Bimpikis et al. [2016], we
assume unit distances, i.e., it takes one period of time to travel
in between any pair of locations. At the beginning of each
time period, for each location i ∈ L, there is a continuous
mass θi ≥ 0 of riders requesting trips from i. The fraction of
riders at iwith destination j ∈ L is given by αij ∈ [0, 1] (thus∑
j∈L αij = 1). We assume that the components of rider de-
mand θ = {θi}i∈L and α = {αij}i,j∈L are stationary and do
not change over time. Riders’ willingness to pay for trips are
i.i.d. random variables with CDF F . Thus, for any i, j ∈ L,
the number of trips demanded from i to j at price pij ≥ 0
would be θiαij(1 − F (pij)). (Riders who are unwilling to
pay the stated prices for their rides leave the market.)
Each driver has a preferred location τ ∈ L. Drivers receive
I ≥ 0 additional utility whenever they start a period in their
preferred locations (irrespective of whether they have a rider).
This preferred location is private information, and represents
a driver’s type. For each location τ ∈ L, the total mass of
available drivers of type τ is given by s(τ) ≥ 0. Drivers have
a discount factor of δ ∈ (0, 1), and an outside option that de-
livers utilityw ≥ 0.4 We assume∑∞t=0 δtI = I/(1−δ) < w,
meaning that the utility from being in one’s favorite location
at all times does not outweigh the outside opportunity.
A ridesharing mechanism matches drivers and riders to
trips, sets riders’ trip prices and drivers’ compensation, and
(potentially) imposes drivers’ penalties for strategic behavior.
At the beginning of each period, a driver whose previous trip
ended at location i chooses whether or not to provide service
at location i. If a driver provides service, the mechanism may
dispatch that driver to (i) pick up some rider with trip origin i,
(ii) relocate to some location, or (iii) stay in the same location.
If a rider going from i to j is picked up by some driver, then
the rider pays the platform the trip price pij ≥ 0. If a driver
of (reported) type τ is dispatched from i to j, the platform
pays them c(τ)ij ≥ 0, regardless of if her dispatch was to pick
up a rider or relocate.5 Drivers who choose to not provide
service in a period can relocate to any location j in the net-
work, are not compensated by the mechanism in this period,
and may be charged a penalty Pj .6 Denote p , {pij}i,j∈L,
c , {c(τ)ij }i,j,τ∈L and P , {Pj}j∈L.
2.1 Ridesharing Mechanisms
We design a ridesharing mechanism that attends to drivers’
heterogeneous preference over locations. Before the begin-
ning of the first time period, the mechanism elicits the pre-
ferred locations from potential drivers. Accounting for rider
demand (θ, α), and the supply s = (s(1), . . . , s(n)) of drivers
of each type, the mechanism determines rider and driver flow,
setting trip prices p, driver compensation c, and driver penal-
ties P . With the consideration of the pricing, penalties, and
their outside options, drivers decide whether or not to partic-
ipate, and then the platform starts to dispatch drivers to trips
and processes payments accordingly in each period.
2.2 Steady-State Equilibrium
Consider a ridesharing mechanism with pricing and compen-
sation (p, c) and no penalties.7 At the beginning of each
period, let x(τ)i be the number of drivers of (reported) type τ
at location i, and let x(τ) ,
∑
i∈L x
(τ)
i denote the total num-
ber of drivers of (reported) type τ on the platform. Let the trip
flow be f , {f (τ)ij }i,j,τ∈L, where f (τ)ij ≥ 0 is the number of
4Throughout the paper, we consider δ to be very close to 1— this
is natural, since an annual interest rate of 4% implies an exponential
discount factor of 0.9999992 over the course of ten minutes.
5It bears mentioning that c(τ)ij need not be a fixed proportion of
pij . In fact, Bimpikis et al. [2016] find that for certain types of net-
works, making driver compensation a fixed proportion of trip price
drastically reduces platform revenue.
6Drivers only choose whether or not to provide service at a loca-
tion and cannot decline dispatches based on the trip destination. This
is consistent with current ridesharing platforms, which hide rider
destinations because of drivers “cherry-picking” rides.
7 Under an incentive-compatible ridesharing mechanism, drivers
will report truthfully and always provide service, so they will never
be charged any penalty.
riders from i to j assigned to drivers of type τ . Let y(τ)ij ≥ 0
be the mass of drivers of type τ at i who are dispatched to
relocate to j without a rider, and set x , {x(τ)i }i,τ∈L and
y , {y(τ)ij }i,j,τ∈L. No driver or rider can be matched multi-
ple times in the same period, thus assuming drivers always
provide service, we have
∑
j∈L f
(τ)
ij + y
(τ)
ij ≤ x(τ)i for all
i ∈ L and all τ ∈ L, and ∑τ∈L f (τ)ij ≤ θiαij(1 − F (pij))
and for all i, j ∈ L.
For a trip with origin i and destination j, if the total rider
demand exceeds driver supply (i.e.,
∑
τ∈L f
(τ)
ij < θiαij(1−
F (pij))), the mechanism may increase the trip price pij and
achieve higher revenue. Therefore for revenue optimization,
we can assume without loss that
∑
τ∈L f
(τ)
ij = θiαij(1 −
F (pij)). When x
(τ)
i > 0, meaning that some type-τ drivers
are at location i, the probability that a given driver of type τ is
dispatched to destination j is (f (τ)ij + y
(τ)
ij )/x
(τ)
i . Assuming
a driver of type τ has truthfully reported her type and will
provide service in all periods, her lifetime expected utility for
starting from location i is of the form
pi
(τ)
i =
∑
j∈L
(c
(τ)
ij + δpi
(τ)
j )
f
(τ)
ij + y
(τ)
ij
x
(τ)
i
+ I · 1{i = τ}, (1)
where 1{·} is the indicator function. The first term in (1)
is the expected compensation and future utility a driver gets
when dispatched to one of the n possible destinations. The
second term corresponds to the idiosyncratic utility drivers
get from starting trips in their favorite locations.
Definition 1 (Steady-State Equilibrium). A steady-state
equilibrium under pricing policy (p, c) is a tuple (f, x, y) s.t.:
(C1) (Driver best-response) Drivers providing service always
maximizes their payoff, i.e. ∀i, τ ∈ L, x(τ)i > 0 ⇒
∀k ∈ L, pi(τ)i ≥ I · 1{i = τ}+ δpi(τ)k .
(C2) (Flow balance) For all locations i ∈ L and driver types
τ ∈ L, x(τ)i =
∑
j∈L f
(τ)
ji + y
(τ)
ji .
(C3) (Market-clearing)
∑
τ∈L f
(τ)
ij = θiαij(1− F (pij)).
(C4) (Individually rational driver entry) Participating drivers
get at least their outside option w; with excess supply
of drivers with type τ , all participating type-τ drivers
get exactly their outside option w.
(C5) (Feasibility) Rider and driver flows are non-negative,
i.e., ∀i, j, τ ∈ L, f (τ)ij , y(τ)ij , x(τ)i ≥ 0; the supply con-
straints are satisfied, i.e., ∀τ ∈ L,∑i∈L x(τ)i ≤ s(τ).
With full knowledge of driver types, the first best revenue
is achieved by setting rider prices p and driver compensations
c s.t. the revenue is optimized in steady state equilibrium:
max
p,c
∑
i∈L
∑
j∈L
∑
τ∈L
pij · f (τ)ij − c(τ)ij (f (τ)ij + y(τ)ij ) (2)
s.t. (f, x, y) is a steady-state equilibrium under (p, c).
The design problem is to compute rider prices p, driver
compensations c, and driver penalties P to optimize plat-
form revenue in the steady state equilibrium, in a way that
drivers will truthfully report their location preferences and
will choose to always provide service.
3 The Preference-Attentive Ridesharing
Mechanism (PARM)
We now introduce our Preference-Attentive Ridesharing
Mechanism (PARM) and show that this mechanism (i) truth-
fully elicits drivers’ location preferences, (ii) incentivizes
drivers to provide service, and (iii) achieves first-best revenue
when supply is unconstrained or when demand is symmetric.
3.1 Alternate Form of the Optimization
The optimization problem (2) need not be convex, and more-
over, even when an optimal solution can be found, it may not
incentivize drivers to report their types truthfully. Denoting
W , w(1 − δ), we present an alternate problem (3), which
guarantees that any optimal solution can be converted into
an optimal solution for (2) using compensation scheme (4)—
while preserving the objective. Specifically, we consider:
max
p,f,x,y
( ∑
i,j,τ∈L
f
(τ)
ij pij
)
−W
∑
i,τ∈L
x
(τ)
i +I
∑
τ∈L
x(τ)τ (3)
s.t. x
(τ)
i =
∑
j∈L
f
(τ)
ji +
∑
j∈L
y
(τ)
ji , ∀i ∈ L, ∀τ ∈ L∑
τ∈L
f
(τ)
ij = θiαij(1− F (pij)), ∀i, j ∈ L∑
i∈L
x
(τ)
i ≤ s(τ), ∀τ ∈ L∑
j∈L
y
(τ)
ij = x
(τ)
i −
∑
j∈L
f
(τ)
ij , ∀i ∈ L, ∀τ ∈ L
f
(τ)
ij , y
(τ)
ij , x
(τ)
i ≥ 0, ∀i, j ∈ L, ∀τ ∈ L.
Our approach is analogous to a similar move by Bimpikis
et al. [2016]— assuming that F is distributed U[0, 1], the
solution space is convex and the optimization problem is
quadratic. We also go a step further by accounting for driver
heterogeneity and the possibility of zero demand at a location,
the latter by paying drivers for relocation dispatches.
Consider the following compensation scheme:
c
(τ)
ij =W− I · 1{i = τ}. (4)
Lemma 1. Consider an optimal solution (p, f, x, y) to prob-
lem (3), and let c be the compensation scheme (4). Then:
(i) (p, c) is an optimal solution to optimization problem (2)
with steady-state equilibrium (f, x, y); and
(ii) lifetime utility (payment and location value) of a truthful
driver is exactly w at every location, i.e. pi(τ)i = w for
all i, τ ∈ L.
Briefly, feasible solutions to (3) satisfy conditions (C2),
(C3) and (C5). Moreover, with W > I , the compensation
c as in (4) is non-negative.
Given (4), drivers receive utility W in expectation per pe-
riod (so w over their lifetimes); this implies (C1) and (C4).
Furthermore, the solution is optimal, since no compensation
scheme can lower the total payment to drivers while fulfilling
the same rider trip flow f .
3.2 Constructing PARM
Definition 2. Given rider demand (θ, α), the Preference-
Attentive Ridesharing Mechanism (PARM):
1. Elicits the location preferences from drivers.
2. Solves (3) with an additional constraint
x(τ)τ ≥ x(τ)i , ∀i ∈ L, τ ∈ L, (5)
for dispatching (f, x, y), and pricing (p, c) determined by
(4).
3. If a type τ driver did not provide service and relocated to
i 6= τ ∈ L, the platform treats her as a type i driver from
then on. If this is the first such deviation for this driver,
the driver pays penalty Pτ , max{maxk∈{P k→τ}, 0}
for P k→τ as solved for in the following system of linear
equations:
pik→τi =1{i 6= τ}
W + δ∑
j
f
(τ)
ij + y
(τ)
ij
xi
pik→τj

+ I · 1{i = k}+ 1{i = τ}(δw − P k→τ ),∀i, k;
w =
∑
i
x
(τ)
i∑
j x
(τ)
j
pik→τi ,∀k. (6)
The system (7) has n2 + n linear equations and n2 + n
unknowns (n2 of the pik→τi and n of the P
k→τ ). Intuitively,
pik→τi describes the utility of a driver of type k pretending to
be type τ and providing service everywhere except τ , where
she instead relocates to k. By construction, P k→τ is the min-
imum penalty needed to equalize driver earnings between this
deviation and truthtelling plus providing service. We take the
maximum over such penalties so no driver wants to pretend
to be type τ and employ this strategy, then max with 0 in case
the calculated penalty is negative.8
If a driver declines to provide service but relocates to her
reported preferred location, she faces no penalty or type re-
assignment. A driver might have a legitimate (idiosyncratic)
reason for not being able to provide service in a period, but
if she relocates to a location she did not report as preferred,
that is taken as an indication that her original report was not
truthful.
We now prove, under the assumption that drivers always
provide service and as a result are never charged any penalty,
that imposing (5) is sufficient to guarantee truthful reporting.
Theorem 1. Assuming all drivers always provide service, it
is a dominant strategy for drivers to report their location pref-
erences truthfully under PARM.
8A negative penalty might arise if the deviation is itself very bad
for drivers, in which case the only way to make the deviating drivers’
utility w is to pay those drivers.
Proof. First observe that by being truthful, each driver gets
utility W =w(1− δ) per period—getting paid W − I at pre-
ferred locations, and W at every other location. As a result,
pi
(τ)
i = w for all τ ∈ L and all i ∈ L. Suppose an infinitesi-
mal driver of type i ∈ L reports that she is of type τ 6= i. At
all j 6= i, τ she gains utility W per period. At i, the driver
makes W + I because the platform, treating her as a type τ
driver, is still paying her W . At τ , she is paid W − I , and
does not get the extra utility I .
With δ → 1, misreporting τ in place of i leads to an in-
crease in the expected payoff in static steady-state equilib-
rium if and only if in equilibrium, the driver with reported
type τ spends more time in location i than in location τ .
Considering the location of a driver treated as type τ as a
Markov chain, then {x(τ)i /x(τ)}i∈L is the stationary distri-
bution, meaning that a driver with type τ spends a plurality
of her time at location τ , and a driver does not benefit from
misreporting her type if all drivers follow the platform’s dis-
patches.
We now consider drivers who may strategically decline to
provide service and show that such deviations are not useful
under PARM, which updates its belief about a driver’s type
after deviations and imposes a penalty on the first such devi-
ation (step 3 of Definition 2).
Theorem 2. Under PARM, it is an ex post Nash equilibrium
for drivers to report their types truthfully and to always pro-
vide service.
Briefly, Theorem 1 and the following Lemma 2 imply that
(i) a profitable misreport must be paired with post-reporting
deviation, and (ii) the most profitable deviation must be the
driver providing service everywhere except the location that
she signaled. The penalties ensure the driver does not get a
utility higher than w from this deviation (or any other), so
there does not exist a profitable deviation.
Drivers are never charged any penalty under the equilib-
rium outcome, but the threat of a penalty is necessary to en-
sure truthful reporting. In certain special economies, a misre-
porting driver might spend many periods at her true preferred
location before being sent to her reported preferred location.
Without penalties, she may simply decline service and relo-
cate back to her actual preferred location, thereby sacrificing
one period of income for the possibility of many periods of
extra idiosyncratic utility. See Appendix C for an example
and discussions.
Lemma 2. Consider any set of driver reports (possibly un-
truthful), and assume that the rest of the drivers provide ser-
vice in each period. Consider a driver of true type τ and
reported type j. If j = τ (truthful), always providing ser-
vice is a best response. If j 6= τ , one of the following is a
best-response: (i) always providing service, or (ii) providing
service at every location except j, where the driver instead
drives to τ .
As an outline of the proof, first note that a truthful driver
makes W at every location, and so it always optimal to pro-
vide service. What if at some point it is optimal for a driver
with j 6= τ to not provide service and drive to some loca-
tion i ∈ L? If i = j, the driver has given up a period of
income and relocated to her least profitable location, which is
sub-optimal. So the driver drives to i 6= j, paying a penalty.
In subsequent periods before another deviation, the platform
considers her as a type i driver and pays her less for trips
starting at i. If i = τ , this decrease in income is exactly
offset by her idiosyncratic utility I . If i 6= τ , the station-
ary distribution of her location (as a Markov chain) is given
by {x(i)j /x(i)}j∈L. Therefore, the expected number of times
she visits τ (and gets extra utility I) before returning to i
(and again making less) is exactly x(i)τ /x
(i)
i ≤ 1, thus the
loss in income is greater than the gain in idiosyncratic util-
ity. By deviating again before returning to i, the driver gains
less idiosyncratic utility in expectation. Furthermore, sym-
metry dictates that it is still optimal to relocate to location i.
This implies that in comparison to deviating and relocating
to location τ , a deviation to location i 6= τ results in lower
continuation payoff and therefore cannot be a best response.
Because the driver will relocate to her true preferred location,
she will make W in subsequent periods. Before deviating,
she makes W + I at τ , W − I at j, and W elsewehere. So
the only place she will deviate from is possibly j, and in that
case will relocate to τ .
3.3 Cases with First-Best Revenue and No Penalty
Although the IC constraint (5) may reduce revenue, we
can characterize some settings where imposing IC does not
lead to a revenue loss: when supply is unconstrained, or
when rider demand is symmetric, PARM achieves the full-
information first-best revenue. Furthermore, no penalty is
necessary to ensure incentive compatibility.
Theorem 3. Suppose s(τ) = ∞ for all τ ∈ L. Then PARM
achieves full-information first-best revenue, and no penalty is
necessary to ensure incentive compatibility.
Briefly, the IC constraint (5) does not bind because at loca-
tion τ , drivers of type τ cost less than drivers of other types.
If drivers of type i 6= τ fulfill many rides at location τ , the
platform can improve its revenue by dispatching drivers of
type τ to fill those rides instead, as long as there are enough
drivers of type τ . An individual driver will visit her signaled
location before visiting any other too many times (in expeca-
tion), so she cannot profitably use a misreport-plus-deviation
to sacrifice one period of income for many periods of id-
iosyncratic utility (as described following Theorem 2). This
makes the threat of penalties unnecessary for ensuring incen-
tive compatibility. Note that the preceding argument makes
no assumption on the demand pattern, and requires only the
availability of supply.
Definition 3. Rider demand (θ, α) is symmetric if ∀i, j, k, l ∈
L we have θi = θk and αij = αkl.
Theorem 4. Suppose that rider demand is symmetric. Then
we can construct a solution to optimization problem (3)
with incentive compatibility constraint (5) such that PARM
achieves full-information first-best revenue, and no penalty is
necessary to ensure incentive compatibility.
To understand Theorem 4, we prove two additional lemmas.
Lemma 3. With symmetric demand, any optimal solution to
(3) satisfies f (τ)ii + y
(τ)
ii ≤ f (τ)ττ + y(τ)ττ for all i, τ ∈ L.
Intuitively, drivers of type τ cost the platform less when
they complete trips at location τ , so it is optimal for the
marginal ride they give at location τ to have a lower price
than at other locations.If demand is symmetric, this means
drivers of type τ provide more rides at location τ than at any
other location.
Lemma 4. If the demand pattern is symmetric, there exists
an optimal solution to (3) such that for all i, j ∈ L and all
τ ∈ L, f (τ)ij = f (τ)ji and y(τ)ij = y(τ)ji = 0.
Intuitively, there is no need for drivers to relocate when
demand is fully symmetric. Moreover, given any optimal so-
lution to (3), we can construct an alternative optimal solution,
where the flow of drivers of each type can be decomposed as
cycles with length 2, i.e., f (τ)ij = f
(τ)
ji .
We can now sketch the proof of Theorem 4. Given sym-
metric demand, Lemma 3 implies driver flow for within-
location trips satisfies the IC constraint (5). For all inter-
location trips, Lemma 4 lets us focus only on bilateral driver
flow between pairs of locations i and j, which should be
served by drivers of type i and j. Even if there are not enough
of those drivers, type τ drivers cost less giving rides to and
from τ , so they will naturally fill more rides in and out of τ
and fewer between i and j. Combining the two cases, drivers
of each type τ do not spend more time at another location
i 6= τ than they do at τ , and imposing the IC constraint (5) is
without loss of revenue. As in Theorem 2, drivers visit their
reported favorite locations before visiting any other location
too many times (in expecation), so they cannot profitably use
misreport-plus-deviations to sacrifice one period of income
for many periods of idiosyncratic utility (as described follow-
ing Theorem 2). This means that penalties not necessary for
ensuring incentive compatibility here.
4 Simulation Results
In this section, we use simulations to analyze the revenue and
social welfare under PARM for settings outside the cases cov-
ered by Theorems 3 and 4—i.e., settings with limited supply
and unbalanced demand.
Social welfare is defined as the total rider value plus
drivers’ utilities from being in their preferred locations, mi-
nus the total opportunity costs incurred by drivers. We
compare PARM with the full-information first-best, and also
a Preference-Oblivious Ridesharing Mechanism (PORM)
which sets prices as in Bimpikis et al. [2016] without con-
sidering drivers’ location preferences, while assuming that
drivers always follow dispatches. In Section 4.2, we also
study the equilibrium outcome under PORM, allowing driver
autonomy. Additional simulation results are presented in Ap-
pendix B. For ease of illustration, we consider two locations
L = {0, 1} throughout the analysis.
4.1 Varying Demand Patterns
Suppose that there are an equal number of drivers favoring
each location: s(0)=s(1)=100. Drivers have outside option
w=40, discount factor δ=0.99, and gain utility I =0.2W =
0.2w(1−δ) per period from being in their preferred locations.
Each rider has value independently drawn ∼ U[0, 1].
(a) Revenue (b) Welfare
Figure 1: Revenue and welfare varying demand θ0 at location 0.
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Figure 2: Total rider trips fulfilled by drivers of each type, with
(αi0, αi1) = (0.25, 0.75), θ = (50, 1000), and s = (100, 100).
Varying Total Demand. We first assume an unbalanced
trip flow α00=α10 = 0.25 and α01=α11 = 0.75 (i.e., three
quarters of riders from each location would like to go to lo-
cation 1). Fixing the total demand at location 1 at θ1 =1000,
and varying θ0 from 0 to 1000, the revenue and welfare under
PARM and benchmarks are as in Figure 1. Although PARM
only necessarily achieves first best revenue when θ0 = 1000
(symmetric demand), we see that PARM achieves the first
best and outperforms PORM unless θ0 is very small, such
that demand from the two locations is highly asymmetric.
When θ0  θ1, almost all rides originate and terminate
at location 1, thus the first best and PORM dispatch most
drivers of both types to provide service at location 1. Fig-
ure 2 illustrates the rider trip flows fulfilled by drivers of
each type under different mechanisms, when θ0 = 50. To
satisfy PARM’s incentive compatibility (IC) constraint, how-
ever, drivers of type 0 must spend a plurality of their time at
location 0. Therefore, PARM completes fewer trips at loca-
tion 1, dispatches more type 0 drivers to fulfill (the less prof-
itable) between-location trips, and asks many type 0 drivers to
relocate back to 1 once they arrive at location 0 (the numbers
after the “+” sign represent driver relocation flow), resulting
in lower revenue and social welfare.
Varying Imbalance in Demand. Fixing θ0 = θ1 = 1000
and varying αi0 for i = 0, 1 (i.e., changing the proportion of
rides with destination 0), the revenue and welfare achieved
by different mechanisms are shown in Figure 3. Similar
to Figure 1, PARM achieves first best revenue and outper-
forms PORM for a wide range of αi0 (though demand is only
symmetric when αi0 = 0.5). For similar reasons as in the
(a) Revenue (b) Welfare
Figure 3: Revenue and welfare varying αi0 for i = 0, 1.
(a) Revenue (b) Welfare
Figure 4: Equilibrium revenue and welfare varying I/W .
above scenario, we see a decline of revenue and welfare un-
der PARM when demand becomes highly imbalanced: in this
case, when αi0 approaches 0 or 1 and almost all riders have
the same destination.
4.2 PORM in Equilibrium
In this section, we analyze a scenario for which we are able
to compute the equilibrium outcome given the pricing under
PORM, and under the setting where drivers are given the flex-
ibility to decide how to drive. Consider two locations L =
{0, 1} and drivers of type 1 only: s(0) = 0, s(1) = 200. All
trips start and end in the same location, i.e., α00 = α11 = 1.
Being oblivious to drivers’ preferences, PORM sets the same
trip price for the two locations and expects the spatial distri-
bution of drivers to be proportional to the distribution of de-
mand. In equilibrium, however, more drivers decide to drive
in location 1 (the preferred location), such that in each period
drivers in 1 are dispatched with probability less than 1 and
achieve the same expected utility as drivers in 0.
Varying Location Preference I . In Figure 4, we fix de-
mand θ0 = θ1 = 1000 and plot revenue and welfare as I ,
the idiosyncratic driver utility, varies from 0 to W . As I in-
creases, welfare and revenue under PARM coincide with the
first best and increase as expected. However, revenue under
PORM (assuming driver compliance) remains constant since
the mechanism is oblivious to drivers’ preferences. We also
see a decrease in welfare and revenue achieved in equilib-
rium under PORM, since more drivers decide to supply in
location 1, instead of in location 0 as dispatched, resulting in
unfulfilled rides in 0 and idle drivers in 1. Beyond I = 0.5W ,
revenue and welfare remain constant, since all drivers are al-
ready supplying location 1.
Figure 5 illustrates rider trip flow fulfilled by the type 1
drivers when I = 0.2W . PARM assigns more drivers to lo-
cation 1 than location 0, but PORM does not. However, in
equilibrium more drivers end up at location 1 anyway, lead-
ing to 25 units of drivers idling at location 1.
0 1
12080
(a) Type 1: PARM
0 1
100100
(b) Type 1: PORM
0 1
100 + 2575
(c) Type 1: PORM Eq.
Figure 5: Rider trips fulfilled by type 1 drivers, with s = (0, 200),
θ = (1000, 1000), α00 =α11 =1, α01 =α10 =0, and I = 0.2W .
(a) Revenue (b) Welfare
Figure 6: Equilibrium revenue and welfare varying θ1/θ0
Varying Demand Ratio θ0/θ1. In Figure 6, we fix θ1 =
1000, I/W = 0.2, and vary θ0 from 0 to 2000. We see that
PARM revenue coincides with the first-best and significantly
exceeds the revenue of PORM. The revenue and welfare of
the equilibrium outcome under PORM is much lower, how-
ever, because drivers over-supply the preferred location 1,
leaving rider trips in 0 unfulfilled. It is curious that with
highly imbalanced demand, an increase in θ0 initially leads
to reduced equilibrium revenue and welfare—this is because
with higher demand at location 0, PORM sets a higher price at
location 1 and accepts fewer location 1 trips in order to com-
plete more trips in 0. The drivers, however, are only willing
to drive in 0 when θ0 is high enough that the low probabil-
ity of getting a ride in 1 offsets the extra utility I . That said,
PARM does not always outperform the equilibrium outcome
under PORM. (See Appendix B for an example.)
5 Discussion
We have proposed the Preference-Attentive Ridesharing
Mechanism (PARM) for pricing and dispatch in the pres-
ence of driver location preferences. It is an equilibrium under
PARM for drivers to report their preferred locations truthfully
and follow the mechanism’s dispatches. PARM achieves first-
best revenue in settings with unconstrained driver supply or
symmetric rider demand, and we show via simulations that
even outside those scenarios, PARM achieves close to first-
best welfare and revenue and outperforms a mechanism that
is oblivious to location preferences.
Our analysis suggests that incorporating drivers’ location
preferences is compatible with other aspects of ridesharing
pricing and marketplace design—even though drivers could
in principle game the system by expressing preferences for
locations associated with more highly compensated rides.
There are two key elements to our approach that both seem
likely to provide practical insight beyond the specific frame-
work and mechanism considered here: First, we recognize
that respecting drivers’ location preferences creates value,
which can at least partially substitute for cash compensa-
tion. Then, we incentivize truthful location preference reve-
lation through a variation on a revealed preference approach.
Indeed, PARM uses drivers’ deviations from proposed dis-
patches to learn about their preference types—a driver who
chooses to drive to i instead of her assigned location is in-
ferred to prefer location i and subsequently faces the com-
pensation profile of other drivers with that preference .
We note that for our approach to work, it is important that
drivers’ preferences do not change frequently over the course
of the day. If drivers’ underlying types were moving targets,
it would be much harder to enforce incentive compatibility by
tracking endogenous responses to dispatch assignments.
Acknowledgements
Kominers gratefully acknowledges the support of National
Science Foundation grant SES-1459912 and the Ng Fund
and the Mathematics in Economics Research Fund of the
Harvard Center of Mathematical Sciences and Applications.
Rheingans-Yoo gratefully acknowledges the support of the
Economic Design Fellowship of the Harvard Center of Math-
ematical Sciences and Applications, the Harvard College
PRISE Fellowship, and the Harvard College Research Pro-
gram.
References
[Afe`che et al., 2018] Philipp Afe`che, Zhe Liu, and Costis
Maglaras. Ride-hailing networks with strategic drivers:
The impact of platform control capabilities on perfor-
mance. Technical report, Columbia Business School.
Available at SSRN 3120544, 2018.
[Angrist et al., 2017] Joshua D Angrist, Sydnee Caldwell,
and Jonathan V Hall. Uber vs. taxi: A driver’s eye view.
NBER Working Paper No. 23891, 2017.
[Banerjee et al., 2015] Siddhartha Banerjee, Ramesh Johari,
and Carlos Riquelme. Pricing in ride-sharing platforms:
A queueing-theoretic approach. In Proceedings of the Six-
teenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation,
pages 639–639. ACM, 2015.
[Banerjee et al., 2017] Siddhartha Banerjee, Daniel Freund,
and Thodoris Lykouris. Pricing and optimization in shared
vehicle systems: An approximation framework. In Pro-
ceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and
Computation, pages 517–517. ACM, 2017.
[Besbes et al., 2018] Omar Besbes, Francisco Castro, and
Ilan Lobel. Spatial capacity planning. Available at SSRN
3292651., 2018.
[Bimpikis et al., 2016] Kostas Bimpikis, Ozan Candogan,
and Saban Daniela. Spatial Pricing in Ride-Sharing Net-
works. Working paper, available at SSRN 2868080, 2016.
[Castillo et al., 2017] Juan Camilo Castillo, Dan Knoepfle,
and Glen Weyl. Surge pricing solves the wild goose chase.
In Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Eco-
nomics and Computation, pages 241–242. ACM, 2017.
[Chen and Sheldon, 2015] M Keith Chen and Michael Shel-
don. Dynamic pricing in a labor market: Surge pricing and
the supply of uber driver-partners. University of Califor-
nia (Los Angeles) Working Paper URL http://citeseerx. ist.
psu. edu/viewdoc/download, 2015.
[Chen et al., 2017] M Keith Chen, Judith A Chevalier, Pe-
ter E Rossi, and Emily Oehlsen. The value of flexible
work: Evidence from uber drivers. NBER Working Paper
No. 23296, 2017.
[Cohen et al., 2016] Peter Cohen, Robert Hahn, Jonathan
Hall, Steven Levitt, and Robert Metcalfe. Using big data
to estimate consumer surplus: The case of uber. NBER
Working Paper No. 22627, 2016.
[Cook et al., 2018] Cody Cook, Rebecca Diamond, Jonathan
Hall, John List, Paul Oyer, et al. The gender earnings
gap in the gig economy: Evidence from over a million
rideshare drivers. Technical report, Stanford University,
2018.
[Hall and Krueger, 2016] Jonathan V Hall and Alan B
Krueger. An analysis of the labor market for uber’s driver-
partners in the united states. NBER Working Paper No.
22843, 2016.
[Hall et al., 2015] Jonathan Hall, Cory Kendrick, and Chris
Nosko. The effects of uber’s surge pricing: A case study.
Technical report, The University of Chicago Booth School
of Business, 2015.
[Hall et al., 2017] Jonathan V Hall, John J Horton, and
Daniel T Knoepfle. Labor market equilibration: Evidence
from uber. Technical report, New York University Stern
School of Business, 2017.
[Ma et al., 2019] Hongyao Ma, Fei Fang, and David C.
Parkes. Spatio-temporal pricing for ridesharing platforms.
In Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Eco-
nomics and Computation. ACM, 2019.
[Ostrovsky and Schwarz, 2019] Michael Ostrovsky and
Michael Schwarz. Carpooling and the economics of
self-driving cars. In Proceedings of the 2019 ACM
Conference on Economics and Computation. ACM, 2019.
Appendix
We provide in Appendix A the proofs that are omitted from
the body of the paper. Additional simulation results are pre-
sented in Appendix B. We present in Appendix C an example
of an incentive issue when no penalty is imposed.
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Lemma 1. Consider an optimal solution (p, f, x, y) to prob-
lem (3), and let c be the compensation scheme (4). Then:
(i) (p, c) is an optimal solution to optimization problem (2)
with steady-state equilibrium (f, x, y); and
(ii) lifetime utility (payment and location value) of a truthful
driver is exactly w at every location, i.e. pi(τ)i = w for
all i, τ ∈ L.
Proof. The first term of the objective of (3) is the same as
the income portion of the objective of (2). The constraints on
this optimization are exactly the equilibrium conditions (C2),
(C3) and (C5). Thus, it suffices to devise a compensation
scheme where driver income everywhere is exactly equal to
outside option, i.e. pi(τ)i = w (this will necessarily satisfy
(C1) and (C4)). This will be revenue-optimal because by (C4)
drivers cannot be making less thanw. Consider compensation
scheme (4):
c
(τ)
ij =W− I · 1{i = τ}
The second term means that any idiosyncratic utility a driver
gets is extracted by the platform, so any dispatched driver
makes exactly W in that period. Thus, pi(τ)i = w =
W
1−β
exactly when probability of dispatch at every location is 1,
i.e.
x
(τ)
i =
∑
j∈L
f
(τ)
ij + y
(τ)
ij , ∀i ∈ L, ∀τ ∈ L
This is equivalent to the second-to-last constraint of (3), so
any optimal solution to (3) will have pi(τ)i = w, ∀i ∈ L, so
(C1) and (C4) are satisfied. Thus an optimal solution to (3)
corresponds to an optimal solution to (2) under compensation
scheme (4).
A.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Theorem 2. Under PARM, it is an ex post Nash equilibrium
for drivers to report their types truthfully and to always pro-
vide service.
Proof. By Theorem 1, if a driver is going to always provide
service, she cannot profitably misreport. By Lemma 2, if a
driver reports her type truthfully, it is not profitable for her
to strategically decline to provide service. So for a misreport
to be profitable, it must be paired with post-reporting devi-
ation (strategically declining to provide service). Lemma 2
characterizes what this deviation must be: providing service
everywhere except her signaled location. There she instead
drives to her true preferred location.
Thus to show incentive compatibility without penalty, it
suffices to show this strategy is not more profitable than truth-
fully reporting and always providing service. Recall how we
calculate penalties:
pik→τi =1{i 6= τ}
W + δ∑
j
f
(τ)
ij + y
(τ)
ij
xi
pik→τj

+ I · 1{i = k}+ 1{i = τ}(δw − P k→τ ),∀i, k;
w =
∑
i
x
(τ)
i∑
j x
(τ)
j
pik→τi ,∀k. (7)
Where Pτ , max{maxk∈{P k→τ}, 0}. If we had set penal-
ties for switching types from k to τ to be P k→τ , a driver of
type k pretending to be type τ following the strategy from
Lemma 2 would get utility as defined in (7). The first term
is the compensation from providing service at locations that
are not τ . The second term is idiosyncratic utility from being
at her favorite location. The third term is the utility from de-
clining to provide service at τ and driving to k, after which
she pays the penalty, the platform updates her type, and she
makes w afterwards. Then with random initialization, by (7)
the driver’s expected utility is exactly w. Because we set
Pτ = maxk P
k→τ , The equality in (7) is an inequality, but
still the driver’s expected utility is no more than w, which is
what she would make by reporting truthfully and always pro-
viding service. Therefore, it is a best response for each driver
to report truthfully and always provide service.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 2
Lemma 2. Consider any set of driver reports (possibly un-
truthful), and assume that the rest of the drivers provide ser-
vice in each period. Consider a driver of true type τ and
reported type j. If j = τ (truthful), always providing ser-
vice is a best response. If j 6= τ , one of the following is a
best-response: (i) always providing service, or (ii) providing
service at every location except j, where the driver instead
drives to τ .
Proof. Suppose we have a driver of type τ who has signaled
she was of type j. If j = τ , then the driver makes W every
period she provides service. If j 6= τ , the driver makesW +I
every period she provides service at τ (extra utility but not
paid less), makes W − I every period they provide service at
j (paid less but not extra utility), and makes W every period
elsewhere.
First, we will show that the driver will never choose to not
provide service and drive to τ . This move will not change
how the platform treats the driver in the future. So in either
case (j = τ and j 6= τ ) the driver has lost W in income and
then relocated to the location where she makes weakly least
in the network. This is not profitable, so the driver will not
choose to not provide service and drive to τ .
Next, we will show that if a driver chooses to not provide
service, she will drive to her true preferred location. Suppose
this driver of type τ declines to provide service. As estab-
lished in the previous paragraph, she will not relocate to her
previously signaled location, so she may pay a penalty, but the
penalty is the same no matter where she relocates to. she has
the choice of where to drive in the network and will choose
the location i that maximizes her expected lifetime earnings
given that she will be treated as type i in the future. If lo-
cation i is such a best-response choice, then for every future
deviation, the symmetry of the situation implies that i will be
a best-response choice then too. So we can assume that for
all future deviations, the driver drives to i.
In the case that i = τ , the driver expects to make W =
w(1 − δ) in every period after arriving at location τ . Now
suppose that i 6= τ . The driver gets utilityW+I every period
she is at location τ , andW −I every period she is at i, andW
everywhere else. With δ → 1, this means choice of i 6= τ can
only be better than τ if she spends more time at τ than i before
her next deviation, at which point she faces the same choice.
However, we know that x(i)i ≥ x(i)τ , which by the Ergodic
Theorem implies that a driver treated as type i will spend on
average at least as much time at location i than location τ .
This implies that if the deviant driver starts at location i, the
expected number of times she visits location τ before return-
ing to i is at most 1 (otherwise she would spend more time on
average at τ than i). So for any t, E
[
N
(i)
τ (t)
]
≤ E
[
N
(i)
i (t)
]
,
where t is the number of time periods andN (i)j (t) is the num-
ber of periods in which the driver is in location j. So there
is no time in the future by which point the driver expects to
have been at τ more than i if she follows platform instruc-
tions. The driver can deviate from platform instructions, but
as established previously, without loss of best response she
will drive to location i, which puts in the same position as
before.
Finally, we will show that a driver will choose to provide
service everywhere if j = τ and will choose to provide ser-
vice everywhere except possibly j if j 6= τ . We have already
established that a driver’s best relocation is her true preferred
location but that a driver will not decline to provide service
and drive to her previously signaled location. It follows im-
mediately that truthful drivers (those whose previously sig-
naled location is their true preferred location) will always
provide service. So we assume j 6= τ . Because a driver’s
post-deviation relocation is her preferred relocation, she will
make W in every period thereafter, after paying the platform
a penalty. Before deviation, the driver makes W + I at τ ,
W − I at j, and W everywhere else. So the only location she
might not want to provide service at is j. Everywhere else her
earnings are the same as post-deviation, and the only time it
will be less is when at j. So the driver will always choose to
provide service at locations other than j.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 3
Theorem 3. Suppose s(τ) = ∞ for all τ ∈ L. Then PARM
achieves full-information first-best revenue, and no penalty is
necessary to ensure incentive compatibility.
Proof. We show full-information first-best revenue by show-
ing the IC constraint does not bind. Consider an optimal so-
lution to (3) without IC constraint (5). The flow constraint
allows us to decompose the flow of type τ drivers into cy-
cles with various mass. Suppose one of these cycles does
not go through location τ . Then it is optimal to replace that
driver flow with drivers of type j, for location j in the cy-
cle. (this can necessarily happen because there is no supply
constraint). The new drivers do exactly what the old drivers
did, so the demand met is exactly the same and the flow con-
straints are still satisfied. However, they end up in their pre-
ferred location strictly more, so the last term of the objective
strictly increases. So the previous solution was not optimal.
So all the cycles of type τ driver flow go through location τ .
This means x(τ)τ ≥ x(τ)j ,∀τ, j because all flow of τ drivers
through j also goes through τ . So any optimal solution to (3)
naturally satisfies the IC constraint (5). So imposing the IC
constraint does not lead to an objective loss.
We show no penalty is necessary to achieve incentive com-
patibility by showing that the strategy described in Lemma 2
is not profitable. Consider δ → 1 and suppose a driver of
type τ reports he is of type i. Every time he visits location
τ , he will visit location i before returning to τ . Otherwise,
there would be some non-negative flow in a cycle through τ
but not through i, which the platform could more optimally
fill with (reported) type τ drivers. So the driver will always
eventually visit i and will never visit location τ more than
once before doing so. The driver makes W + I at location τ ,
then W every period before giving a ride to i, then 0 at loca-
tion i, before relocating to τ and being thereafter treated as τ ,
makingW in every subsequent period. So compared to truth-
ful behavior, the driver makes a maximum of I extra at τ and
loses a minimum of W ≥ at location i before revealing his
true type and makingW every period thereafter. With δ → 1,
this strategy is not more profitable than truthful reporting and
always providing service. So even without a penalty, PARM
is incentive compatible.
A.5 Proof of Lemma 3
Lemma 3. With symmetric demand, any optimal solution to
(3) satisfies f (τ)ii + y
(τ)
ii ≤ f (τ)ττ + y(τ)ττ for all i, τ ∈ L.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary i, τ . First notice that in any
optimal solution, y(τ)ii = y
(τ)
ττ = 0 because these are the
drivers are not fulfilling rides and staying in the same
location, which adds cost to the system without fulfilling
demand or helping to satisfy any of the constraints. Next, if
f
(τ)
ii > 0 and f
(j)
ττ > 0 for j 6= τ , then it is more optimal to
switch drivers of type j going τ → τ with drivers of type τ
going i→ i. This fulfills the same demand, but with less cost
because you have drivers of type τ at location τ more. This
violates the optimality of the original solution, so we can
assume that f (τ)ii > 0 ⇒ f (j)ττ = 0 ∀j 6= τ and that ∃j 6= τ
s.t. f (j)ττ > 0⇒ f (τ)ii = 0. So we find ourselves in one of two
cases:
Case 1. f (τ)ii = 0: If this is the case, then f
(τ)
ii ≤ f (τ)τ because
f
(τ)
ττ ≥ 0.
Case 2. f (τ)ii > 0: Then f
(j)
ττ = 0 ∀j 6= τ . Suppose
f
(τ)
ii > f
(τ)
ττ . Then
∑
j f
(j)
ii >
∑
j f
(j)
ττ ⇒ pii < pττ be-
cause the demand pattern is symmetric. I will show it is more
optimal for the platform to raise pii, f
(τ)
ττ and lower pττ , f
(τ)
ii
by infinitesimal amounts. Making substitutions and differen-
tiating, we get the derivative of the first term of the objective
with respect to pii is given as follows:
d
dpii
OBJ1 = 1− 2 pii
θiαii
We know that θiαii = θtαtt and that pii < pττ . So
d
dpii
OBJ1 >
d
dpττ
OBJ1
So the platform can make a marginal increase in the first term
of the objective by raising pii and lowering pττ by infinitesi-
mal amounts, shifting an infinitesimal amount of f (τ)ii to f
(τ)
ττ
to make the market clear. The same number of drivers are
in the the system, so it does not change the second term of
the objective. And it increases the third term in the objec-
tive because we just shifted drivers of type τ to only be at
location τ . So this shift brings us to a more optimal solu-
tion, which is a contradiction. So without the IC constraint
imposed, f (τ)ii ≤ f (τ)ττ ∀i, τ.
A.6 Proof of Lemma 4
Lemma 4. If the demand pattern is symmetric, there exists
an optimal solution to (3) such that for all i, j ∈ L and all
τ ∈ L, f (τ)ij = f (τ)ji and y(τ)ij = y(τ)ji = 0.
Proof. Consider an optimal solution to the platform’s opti-
mization problem. Now set pij = pji and f
(τ)
ij =
1
2 (f
(τ)
ij +
f
(τ)
ji ), y
(τ)
ij =
1
2 (y
(τ)
ij + y
(τ)
ji ). The same number of drivers
of each type is used, so the supply constraint is still satis-
fied. Flow into and out of a location before was the same,
so it will be the same now too, so the flow constraint is sat-
isfied. And the symmetry of the demand pattern implies that
θiαij = θjαji and so if the market cleared before, setting
prices and flows to be the same will still clear the market.
So all we need to show is that revenue is weakly better
when pij = pji, holding number of drivers used (and thus
pij + pji) constant. Let pij + pji = q. Then isolating the part
of the objective that changes under this switch yields:
θiαijpij(1− pij) + θjαjipji(1− pji)
=θiαijpij(1− pij) + θiαij(q − pij)(1− (q − pij))
∂
∂pij
=θiαij
(
1− 2pij − 1 + 2q − 2pij
)
0 =2q − 4pij
pij =
q
2
So holding pij + pji constant, equal prices is optimal. So
any solution to the optimization problem can be made without
loss of optimality into a solution with f (τ)ij = f
(τ)
ji , y
(τ)
ij =
y
(τ)
ji ∀i, j, τ . Having drivers flowing back and forth without
giving rides is sub-optimal, so this implies y(τ)ij = y
(τ)
ji =
0.
A.7 Proof of Theorem 4
Theorem 4. Suppose that rider demand is symmetric. Then
we can construct a solution to optimization problem (3)
with incentive compatibility constraint (5) such that PARM
achieves full-information first-best revenue, and no penalty is
necessary to ensure incentive compatibility.
Proof. We will show full-information first-best revenue by
showing the IC constraint does not bind. By Lemma 3,
the symmetry of the demand pattern means that f (τ)ii ≤
f
(τ)
ττ ∀i, τ . By Lemma 4, we can restrict our attention to so-
lutions where all flow of drivers is bilateral and there are no
floating drivers. Suppose in an optimal solution x(τ)i > x
(τ)
τ .
This implies
∑
j 6=i f
(τ)
ij >
∑
j 6=τ f
(τ)
τj , which in turn implies
that there exists a location j s.t. f (τ)ij = f
(τ)
ji > f
(τ)
τj = f
(τ)
jτ .
We find ourselves in one of two cases:
1. Exists k 6= τ s.t.f (k)τj = f (τ)jτ > 0. Then we can
switch some type τ drivers going i → τ → i with
some type k drivers going τ → j → τ . Formally,
we make f (k)τj , f
(k)
jτ , f
(τ)
ij , f
(τ)
ji smaller by  and make
f
(τ)
τj , f
(τ)
jτ , f
(k)
ij , f
(k)
ji larger by . All the same demand is
filled, the same number of drivers of each type are used,
and we’ve swapped drivers in a way that preserves the flow
constraint, so all the constraints are satisfied. We’ve just
strictly increased x(τ)τ while weakly increasing xkk (in-
crease in the case that k = i), which decreases our cost.
This improvement is a contradiction with the optimality of
the original solution.
2. DNE k 6= τ s.t. f (k)τj = f (τ)jτ > 0. Then
∑
k f
(k)
ij =∑
k f
(k)
ji >
∑
k f
(k)
τj =
∑
k f
(k)
jτ . The symmetry of
the demand pattern then implies that pij = pji <
pτj = pjτ , and so it is an objective improvement to raise
pij , pji, f
(τ)
τj , f
(τ)
jτ by  and lower pτj , pjτ , f
(τ)
ij , f
(τ)
ji by .
This violates the optimality of the original solution.
So there exists an optimal bilateral-flow solution, and this so-
lution must have x(τ)i ≤ x(τ)τ ∀i, τ .
We will show no penalty is necessary to achieve incen-
tive compatibility by showing that the deviation described
in Lemma 2 is not profitable for the solution constructed in
Lemma 4. Consider δ → 1. We know that for all i, j, τ that
f
(τ)
iτ ≥ f (τ)ij , so a driver of (reported) type τ is more likely to
be sent to τ than j no matter what location she is at. So, with
random initialization of drivers, a driver of type j pretend-
ing to be type τ is more likely to be sent to τ before than j
than the other way around. Even if sent to j first, she is more
likely than not to visit τ before visiting j again. When the
driver visits j, she declines to provide service, giving up W
in income and then relocating to τ , making W in every sub-
sequent period. When the driver visits τ , she gets I ≤ W in
extra idiosyncratic utility. However, the probability she visits
i (and lose W ) before τ is at least 12 . So from the beginning
of the game to the end of her first period in location τ or i,
she loses more in expectation than she gains. Even if she is
sent to τ first, the probability she visits i (losing W and then
revealing her true preference) before returning to τ and mak-
ing another I is less than 12 , so she is still making less than if
she had truthfully reported and always provided service.
B Additional Simulation Results
We present in this section additional simulation results omit-
ted from the body of the paper. We consider the same setting
as in Section 4.2, with two locations L = {0, 1}, drivers of
type 1 only: s(0) = 0, s(1) = 200, and trips start and end in
the same location: α00=α11=1.
Varying Demand Ratio θ1/θ0. In Figure 7, we set I/W =
0.2, θ0 = 1000 and vary θ1 from 0 to 2000. We see a sim-
ilar trend as in Figure 1, with PARM doing worse than even
equilibrium PORM for very small values of θ1. When θ1 is
small compared to θ0, but all the drivers are of type 1, PARM
employs some drivers to do idle in location 1, just to satisfy
the IC constraint, so that more drivers can be employed to
provide service in location 0. This is very costly, and leads
to a larger reduction in revenue and welfare than just setting
prices obliviously and having drivers strategize.
(a) Revenue (b) Welfare
Figure 7: Equilibrium revenue and welfare varying θ1/θ0
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Figure 8: Rider trip and idle driver flows, with θ = (1000, 100),
α = [(1.0, 0.0), (0.0, 1.0)], s = (0, 200), and I = 0.2W .
Figure 8 illustrates driver flow for θ1 = 100 = 0.1θ0.
PORM and equilibrium PORM are similar because there are
not that many many rides to fill at location 1, therefore hav-
ing a few units of idle drivers is sufficient to reduce the earn-
ings at location 1, so that the majority of the drivers are sill
willing to supply in location 0. PARM, in contrast, employs
many drivers to idle around location 1 to satisfy IC. This is
very costly, and leads to worse performance. It is worth not-
ing that as θ1 increases, the social welfare achieved by the
equilibrium outcome under PORM in fact does not increase,
due to the increased amount of idle drivers at location 1.
Varying Driver Supply s1. We now examine the effect of
varying the supply of drivers of type 1 (while still keeping
the supply of driver of type 0 at zero). In Figure 9, we
set I = 0.2W , θ0 = θ1 = 1000, and vary s1 from 0 to
1000. Revenue and welfare under PARM coincide with first-
best and outperform PORM. All the mechanisms improve in
profit and welfare as supply increases, but PARM is better
able to use the additional drivers. Under PORM in equilib-
rium, drivers again over-supply the preferred location 1, caus-
ing rides at location 0 to get dropped. Eventually, there are
so many drivers that they can fill all the demand, even with
drivers idling at location 1. At this point, equilibrium PORM
revenue coincides with PORM revenue, though the welfare is
still lower.
(a) Revenue (b) Welfare
Figure 9: Equilibrium revenue and welfare varying s1
C Incentive Problem Without Penalty
Figure 10 illustrates driver flow for θ1 = θ0 = 100, α =
[(1.0, 0.0), (0.0, 1.0)], s = (200, 5), I = 0.2W . Importantly,
there is no demand between locations, so once a driver is as-
signed to a location, they will continue giving rides there and
never visit another location, unless they decline to provide
service in a period and relocate. Then a type 1 driver has a
useful deviation. She reports that she is type 0, then if she
is sent to location 1, she provides service in every period.
Thus she prefers location 1 but is being paid as if she does
not, and is never sent to location 0 (where she would be paid
less) because there is no demand between locations. If this
happens, she gets utility w + I1−δ = 48 over her lifetime.
If instead she is sent to location 0, she does not provide ser-
vice the first period and relocates to location 1, after which
she provides service and the platform treats her as type 1. If
this happens, she gets utility w − W = 39.4 over her life-
time. So her expected lifetime utility from this deviation is
34
59 · 39.4 + 2559 · 48 ≈ 43.16, which is greater than her util-
ity from reporting truthfully and providing service, which is
w = 40. So this deviation is useful. The key thing going on
here is that although more type 0 drivers are at location 0 than
1, an individual type 0 driver might spend their entire lifetime
at location 1, which incentivizes type 1 drivers to misreport,
taking the risk of one lost period of income in order to get
a lifetime of idiosyncratic utility. In this case, the markov
chain describing the movement of a type 0 driver is discon-
nected, but this issue also occurs when the markov chain is
only very weakly connected and the driver is balancing one
period of income versus many periods of idiosyncratic util-
ity. The penalty is calculated such that if a driver does the
deviation described here, the extra loss when they decline to
provide service makes the deviation not useful. And in our
proof of Theorem 2, we show that this deviation is the best
of all non-truthful strategies, so the penalty ensures incentive
compatibility.
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Figure 10: Rider trip and idle driver flows, with θ = (100, 100),
α = [(1.0, 0.0), (0.0, 1.0)], s = (200, 5), and I = 0.2W .
